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ÜBERSEERING: A EUROPEAN
COMPANY PASSPORT
INTRODUCTION
Today more than ever, market players realize that entering
into business transactions with “foreigners” involves more
than a mere exchange of goods and services….freedom of establishment and the abolition of national barriers bring intensified competition. Consequently, company managers are
urged to take daring initiatives: a complete transfer of business undertakings might well turn out to be necessary in order
to survive.1

O

ne of the fundamental goals of the European Community
2
(EC) is the establishment of a common market, an objective codified in the Treaty Establishing the European Commu3
nity. During the last ten years, European nations have taken
boundless steps to remove the physical, fiscal, and technical
4
barriers that divided them. The results have been rewarding.
The common market has already created over 2.5 million jobs
1. STEPHAN RAMMELOO, CORPORATIONS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(2001) [hereinafter RAMMELOO].
2. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, part 1
art. 2, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. Under the Treaty:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common
market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing
the common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to
promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary
growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of
economic performance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and
economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.
Id. At present, the following countries are Member States of the EC: Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. Europa, The European Union at a Glance, at
http://europa.eu.int/abc/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
3. EC TREATY, supra note 2, part 1 art. 2.
4. See generally Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the
Commission to the European Council, COM(85)310 final (describing the completion of the European market in terms of the removal of “physical, technical
and fiscal” barriers).
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5

and added about 900 billion euros to the economy. Studies
show that if integration is completed, an additional five billion
6
euros will flow into the economy. Nevertheless, this goal may
not be realized if member states do not continue to take the
7
necessary steps to integrate.
Company law is one area of law that is criticized for not keep8
ing up with the integration process. By treaty, EC citizens
have the right to set up a business in any member state and
receive the same treatment as a national doing business in that
9
10
state. This is referred to as the freedom of establishment, and
5. A Healthy EU Single Market: Frits Bolkestein and Anne-Marie Michel
(Radio Netherlands broadcast, Jan. 14, 2003), at http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots
/html/eu030114.html.
6. Id.
The IMA’s study, prepared by the Centre for European Economic Research, a German institute whose initials are ZEW, estimates that a
single market could bring Euro 5 billion ($5.8 billion) or more then a
year in added economic benefits, and increase Europeans’ pension
pots by about 9%. Such sums may be largely guesswork, but the obstacles to trading are clearly formidable and costly.
Id.
7. Id.
8. Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Modern
Regulatory Framework for Company law in Europe, Letter from the Chairman, (Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter High Level Group Report].
9. EC TREATY, supra note 2, art. 48 (ex 58). It states that:
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member
State and having their registered office, central administration or
principal place of business within the Community shall, for
the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural
persons who are nationals of Member States.
Id. States and member states, in this Note, refer to the EC states.
10. EC TREATY, supra note 2, art. 42 (ex 52). It states that:
Restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting
up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member
State established in the territory of any Member State. Freedom of
establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities
as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in
particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.
Id.
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is codified in Articles 42 and 48 of the Treaty Establishing the
11
European Community (The EC Treaty). However, companies
with headquarters in more than one member state or companies
that want to move from one state to another still face substan12
13
tial barriers. Article 293 of the EC Treaty requires member
states to negotiate and secure cross-border recognition for companies, but states’ attempts to secure such recognition have
been fruitless. In 1956, member states negotiated the Hague
Conference on the Mutual Recognition of Companies, which
14
would have made recognition mandatory between signatories.
15
The Convention, however, was defeated. A similar draft treaty
16
Currently, member states are deadwas defeated in 1968.
locked on this issue. Lack of consensus about corporate recogni17
tion is neither consistent with the goal of a single market nor
practical in an economic area where business transactions often
18
involve more than one member state and corporations are ma19
jor players in the economy.
Not surprisingly, companies have found themselves at the
center of the multi-national corporate recognition dispute. For
this reason, changes in the law have been prompted by litiga11. Id.
12. Uwe Blaurock, Berger Lecture, Steps Toward a Uniform Corporate
Law in the European Union, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 377, 379 (1998).
13. EC TREATY, supra note 2, art. 293 (ex 220). This article states that:
Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations
with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals: the mutual recognition of companies or firms within the
meaning of the second paragraph of Art. 48 (ex 58), the retention of
legal personality in the event of transfer of their seat from one country to another, and the possibility of mergers between companies or
firms governed by the laws of different countries.
Id.
14. RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 24 (“The 1956 Draft Treaty of the Hague
Conference on the Mutual Recognition of the Legal Personality of Companies”).
15. Id.
16. CHARLOTTE VILLIERS, EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW – TOWARD DEMOCRACY?
16 (1998) [hereinafter VILLIERS]. This treaty was defeated because it was not
ratified by the Netherlands. Id.
17. See generally RAMMELOO, supra note 1.
18. See High Level Group Report, supra note 8, at 101 (“There is wide demand for community law to facilitate cross frontier restructuring.”).
19. RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 1.
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tion initiated by companies. This Note examines the most recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision on the recognition of companies in the matter of Überseering v. Nordic Con20
struction Company. This case, decided in June 2002, arises
out of Germany’s refusal to recognize a Dutch corporation with
its headquarters in Germany. In the decision, the court held
that the freedom of establishment preempts certain national
laws that preclude recognition. The decision is significant because it expands the scope of the freedom of establishment and
prohibits member states from refusing to recognize companies
that move their headquarters from one state to another.
Part I of this Note provides background on corporate recognition theory in Europe and explains the legal and social importance of recognition theories. Also, Part I illustrates attempts
by the ECJ and the European legislature to alleviate legal problems that arise when a European corporation wants to move its
headquarters to a new member state. Next, Part II of this Note
discusses Überseering and the court’s reasoning in that case.
Part III examines the practical implications of the Überseering
decision and how the Überseering decision requires member
states to recognize companies that are formed in the European
Union under certain circumstances. Finally, this Note concludes that although the Überseering decision does not entirely
solve the problem of corporate recognition, it instructs new
companies to forum-shop for a jurisdiction that will later allow
them to emigrate to a new member state. A new company must
carefully choose its state of registration because the Überseering
court interprets the freedom of establishment as giving a company the right to move to a new state, but not to emigrate from
its home state.
While the court could have gone further in its holding and
made corporate recognition mandatory in all circumstances, the
Überseering result is ultimately favorable to the goal of a single
market because a recent European law creating a corporate
21
form that is recognized throughout Europe largely excludes

20. Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company and
Baumanagement GmbH, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919.
21. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2167/2001 (Oct. 8, 2001) [hereinafter SE
Statute].
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22

Thus, the Überseering ruling at least parnew companies.
tially fills the vacuum left by that law.
I. BACKGROUND: THE STATE OF CORPORATE LAW IN EUROPE
A. An Overview of European Corporate Recognition Doctrines
Each EC member state adheres to one of two fundamental
corporate recognition doctrines: either the “real seat” or “place
23
of incorporation” theory.
Under the “place of incorporation”
doctrine, the laws of the member state where the company is
24
registered govern the company’s internal affairs. Those laws
will govern the company’s legal personality even if it moves into
25
another state. Under this theory, courts in the new state will
recognize the company’s legal personality and apply the foreign
laws that govern the company’s internal affairs if an internal
26
affairs issue arises. This doctrine is subscribed to in Ireland,
27
the U.K., Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
The “place of incorporation” doctrine is beneficial for several
reasons. First, it allows a company to move its headquarters
freely from one state to another state without losing its legal
28
identity. If desirable, a company can move to a more competi-

22. Id. at arts. 4(2), 17, 32, 35–37. The requirements under the statute are
also described infra in Part I (D) of this Note.
23. See generally Eddy Wymeersch, The Transfer of the Company’s Seat in
European Company Law, (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 08/2003, 2003), available at http://www.ecgi.org/wp.
24. Christian Kersting, Corporate Choice of Law—a Comparison of the
United States and European Systems and a Proposal for a European Directive,
28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 37 (2002).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See David Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating
Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the “Race to the Bottom” in
the European Communities, 423 HARV. INT’L L.J. 423, 428 (1991). See also
Werner F. Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine in the Conflict of Corporate Laws,
36 INT’L LAW. 1015, 1016 (2002) [hereinafter Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine].
This doctrine is also adhered to in the United States. See REV. MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT 15.05(c) (1984) (“This Act does not authorize this state to regulate
the organization or internal affairs of a foreign corporation authorized to
transact business in this State.”). Note that Switzerland is not an EU Member State.
28. RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 16.
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29

tive market without being dissolved. Second, the “place of incorporation” theory gives management the autonomy to choose
a jurisdiction that has laws most conducive to the company’s
30
purpose. Finally, this theory makes it easy to ascertain the
law applicable to a company’s internal affairs because the applicable law does not change even if the company moves to a
31
This is a positive result for third parties
new jurisdiction.
such as creditors who want predictability as to which law will
32
apply to an entity with a head-office in more than one state.
Also, this is a positive result for companies because they avoid
complicated res judicata issues when all European courts apply
33
a uniform set of laws to their internal affairs.
By contrast, under the “real seat” doctrine, a company’s internal affairs are governed by the laws of the member state
where the company has its “real seat,” or headquarters. German courts have described the “real seat” as “the location where
the internal management decisions are transformed into day-to34
day activities of the company.” A company must register or
incorporate in the member state where it has its center of administration; and if it does not, the company will not be recog35
nized as a legal entity. Under this view, if a company wants to
move its headquarters to a new member state, it must dissolve
36
Dissolution is costly and impractical beand reincorporate.
37
Germany, France, Italy and
cause of taxes and legal fees.
38
Austria subscribe to the “real seat” doctrine.
29. Id.
30. See Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 2.
31. RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 17.
32. See id.
33. See Werner F. Ebke, Centros—Some Realities and Some Mysteries, 48
AM. J. COMP. L. 623, 654 (2000) [hereinafter Ebke, Centros Mysteries].
34. Wolf-Hennig Roth, From Centros to Ueberseering, Free Movement of
Companies, Private International Law, and Community Law, 52 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 177, 181 (2003) citing BGH 21 Mar 1986, BGHZ 97, 269 at 272.
35. See generally Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919.
36. See Ebke, Centros Mysteries, supra note 33, at 624–25.
37. See Jens C. Dammann, The U.S. Concept of Granting Corporations
Free Choice among State Corporate Law Regimes as a Model for the European
Community, at 10 (Social Science Research Network Electronic Library,
Working Paper File No SSRN_ID418660_code030715560.pdf, Aug. 04, 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=418660 (“If a
U.K. company moves its headquarters to Germany without reincorporating
under German law, German courts will usually treat the organization as a
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The “real seat” doctrine is favorable for a number of reasons.
First, it does not burden local creditors with the task of re39
searching foreign corporate law. Second, the “real seat” doctrine allows member states to apply their laws to all companies
40
headquartered in their territory. Presumably local lawmakers
have the greatest interest in the activities of local companies,
and they will enforce policy that is beneficial to the community
41
as well as to the company. Finally, the “real seat” doctrine
keeps companies from seeking out foreign legal systems that
are more favorable to management and less favorable to share42
holders, workers, or creditors. In fact, the “real seat” doctrine
43
Contemporary
was originally conceived for this purpose.
scholars still fear that if the “real seat” doctrine ceased to exist,
many managers would reincorporate under lenient foreign legal
44
systems to the detriment of local constituencies.
partnership, subjugating all its shareholders to unlimited liability.”) [hereinafter Dammann, Corporations Free Choice].
38. RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 174-217. Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 10.
39. Roth, supra note 34, at 202. According to Roth:
Conflicts rules allocate the burden of and the expenditures for
information with regard to legal orders potenitally unknown to
parties. In this respect, the incorporation and the real seat doctrine
obviously reflect strongly divergent conflicts policies with regard to
adequate allocation of information costs considering the company as a
legal product.
Id.
40. See Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 2.
41. See RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 14.
42. Id. at 18. This argument is known as a “race to the bottom” argument.
See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974) (coining the phrase “race to the bottom” in
the corporate context).
43. See Charny, supra note 27, at 423, 428.
44. See, e.g., Catherine Barnard, Social Dumping and the Race to the Bottom: Some Lessons for the European Union From Delaware?, 25 EURO. L. REV.
57 (2000) (examining the “Delaware theory” in the European context). See
also Werner F. Ebke, The Limited Partnership and Transnational Combinations of Business Forms: “Delaware Syndrome” Versus European Community
Law, 22 INT’L LAW 191 (1988) (arguing that the liberal “incorporation doctrine” is not as workable in Europe as it is in the United States). See also
Catherine Holst, European Company Law after Centros: Is the EU on the Road
to Delaware?, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 323 (2002) (questioning whether the Delaware effect will take place in Europe and suggesting that member states
change their laws to achieve greater efficiency). See also Wymeersch, supra
note 23, at 4.
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B. Multi-State Business and the Transfer of the Seat
The practical differences between “place of incorporation” jurisdictions and “real seat” jurisdictions materialize when a
company moves from one jurisdiction to another. If a company
wants to move its headquarters to a different European state, a
45
few important legal questions arise. First, whether the original home state will allow the company to move without dissolution; second, whether the new state (the host state) will recognize the company as a legal entity; and third, whether the new
state will apply the laws of the place of incorporation, thus recognizing the company’s legal personality.
Let us suppose company X sets up a branch in neighboring
member state Y. Its operation in Y is very successful. Company X opens a factory and an office building in state Y to handle its business there, and soon its sales in state Y account for
most of its business. In addition, a new shareholder from state
Y becomes a 51% stakeholder in company X. The growth in
business seems to have shifted the real seat of company X to
46
state Y.
In another hypothetical, suppose a company in state J decides
to move its headquarters to a new office building in state K because property taxes are lower in state K (which may be only a
few miles away from the old building in state J). Again, a company has transferred its seat or headquarters from one member
state to another. The consequences of these changes differ depending on whether the states follow the “place of incorporation” doctrine or the “real seat” doctrine.
If the companies in the hypothetical moved from one “place of
incorporation” state to another (from the U.K. to the Netherlands, for example), the legal consequences are few. The companies will have to settle with local tax authorities in the origi-

45. Other legal questions may also arise, such as taxation, creditor’s rights
or the treatment of contracts in the host state. These issues are important but
they are beyond the scope of this Note.
46. These facts are very similar to the facts of Überseering. See generally
Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919.
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47

nal state, but, otherwise, the new state will recognize the com48
panies as foreign legal entities.
If the companies moved their headquarters from a “real seat”
state to a “place of incorporation” state, the “place of incorpora49
tion” state will recognize the companies’ identities. The “place
of incorporation” state will apply the laws of the original place
of incorporation to the company. However, most “real seat”
states will not allow companies to move abroad without forcing
the company to wind up and dissolve. For this reason, it is
usually impracticable, if not impossible, for a company to move
50
from a “real seat” state to a “place of incorporation” state.
47. See Case 81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of
Internal Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust PLC, [1988] E.C.R.
5483 [hereinafter Daily Mail].
48. See Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine, supra note 27, at 1015, 1016. See
Dammann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 19-21. Some “place of
incorporation” states, including the U.K. and Ireland, do not simply allow
corporations to change their domicile and retain the laws of their home state.
Id. Corporations from those states will have to move by effecting a merger.
Id.
49. See Roth, supra note 34, at 184. The Roth piece gives this example:
A German limited company (GmbH) that moves its centre of administration, but not its registered seat, to England (moving out) will be
treated as a company still governed by German law: The German
conflicts rule leads to an application of the English conflicts rule,
which in turn calls for the application of the law of incorporation (in
this case German law).
Id.
50. See RAMMELOO, supra note 1. German law prohibits a company from
moving out of Germany. Id. at 192. France may allow such a transfer after a
unanimous shareholders vote and an agreement with the host state, but it is
uncertain that such a transfer is actually envisioned under French law. Id. at
215–16. Italian law allows domestic companies to emigrate, but does not allow foreign companies to immigrate without dissolution. Id. at 224. See also
Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 10, 11. She states that:
In other jurisdictions [apart from Germany, where it is never allowed], the emigration is allowed under certain conditions. These
vary according to jurisdictions: In Spain, there should be a treaty in
force between the exit and the entry state…In France, the majority
opinion defends that the seat may be transferred without dissolution
of the company…This rule allows the supermajority decision only in
case France has concluded an international convention with the entry
state about the maintenance of legal personality. However, as obviously France has not entered into any such convention, the rule is inapplicable.
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If the companies moved their headquarters from a “place of
incorporation” state to a “real seat” state, the result will be just
as severe. The “real seat” state will refuse to recognize the
companies unless they dissolve and reincorporate under its
51
laws. Dissolution entails paying legal fees and, in most cases,
52
capital gains taxes on all assets.
The most complicated scenario arises if the companies moved
from one “real seat” state to another. The original states of incorporation probably will not permit the companies to emigrate
53
Then, even if the companies move, the
without dissolving.
host state will deny recognition and require the companies to
reincorporate. Companies wanting to move their headquarters
in or out of a “real seat” state face considerable obstacles and
may find such a move impossible. EC law does little to alleviate
the disadvantage that those companies face.
Passing a “corporate headquarters transfer” directive could
solve the problems presented by the “real seat” and “place of
incorporation” doctrines. Scholars and the European Commis54
sion have considered this solution. The High Level Group on
55
Company Law Experts, part of the European Commission, reth
quested the creation of a 14 directive dealing exclusively with

Id.
51. See Dammann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 10.
52. Id. at 9.
53. See RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 192, 215. See also Wymeersch, supra
note 23, at 10, 11. Dammann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 16
(for a company to successfully transfer and reincorporate under a new state’s
legal system, a state must either “allow corporations to perform a so-called
identity-preserving transfer of domicile” or reincorporate through a cross
boarder merger but, “in the European Community… corporations will often
find that neither of the two above-described options [are] available”). Germany, for example, does not allow domestic companies to transfer their domicile or to merge with a foreign corporation. Id. at 19, 21.
54. See Kersting, supra note 24, at 67. See also High Level Group Report,
supra note 8, at 111. Ebke proposed another possible solution to the problem
of divergent corporate law theories in Europe in his response to the Centros
case. He suggested that, as in the U.S., European academics, judges and lawyers could create a code of best practices or a model law for Europe to propel
the movement toward integration. See Ebke, Centros Mysteries, supra note
33, at 658, 659. He points particularly to the ALI’s Principles of Corporate
Governance and the ABA’s Revised Model Business Corporation Act. Id.
55. Press Release, EU Institutions, Commission Welcomes Experts’ Report
on Company Law and Corporate Governance (Nov. 4, 2002).
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56

the seat-transfer issue. The Commission plans to present a
57
proposal for the directive sometime within the near future.
However, there is no guarantee that a directive will be ratified
or that it will completely solve the conflict between the “real
seat” and “place of incorporation” doctrine. Recent legislation
58
dealing with similar issues has been vetoed or badly compro59
mised by competing interests within the Union.
C. Beyond Recognition: The “Real Seat” Doctrine and the Protection of Labor Laws and Minimum Capital Contributions
European states have different linguistic, cultural, historical,
and legal backgrounds, and thus, have an interest in preserving
60
their local values through the use of local law. States follow
the “real seat” approach because they want to protect other national laws from being sidestepped by forum-shopping. At the
center of the Überseering dispute are laws requiring minimum
61
capital deposits and laws requiring labor participation in
62
management. Although laws concerning labor mainly affect
large companies and minimum capital requirements mainly

56. High Level Group Report, supra note 8, at 111.
57. Europa, Company Law and Corporate Governance, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/seat-transfer/2004consult_en.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
58. Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover and Other General Bids, 1989 O.J. (C 64) 8. See generally
Christian Kirchner and Richard W. Painter, Takeover Defenses Under Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German Takeover Law: Comparison and Recommendations for Reform, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
th
451 (2002) (analyzing the failed 13 Directive on Takeover Bids and comparing it to the more defensive German and American regimes).
59. SE Statute, supra note 21. See also Stefano Lombardo and Piero Pasotti, The ‘Societas Europaea’: a Network Economics Approach, at 8 (European
Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 19/2004, 2004), available
at http://www.ecgi.org/wp.
60. See James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legal Culture of
Europe, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 55, 80 (1996) (“We fully expect that differences
in legal cultures will play an even greater role in the ways in which EC law
gets implemented within each of the Member States.”). See also Jens C.
Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate Law, 29 YALE J. INT'L L.
477, 485–87 (2004).
61. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, paras. 87, 89.
62. Id.
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affect smaller, less capitalized companies, both laws protect
other constituents such as workers and creditors, respectively.
Many European states impose a minimum capital require63
ment on entities that request limited liability. Theoretically,
the requirement protects creditors and potential tort victims by
64
assuring that assets are paid into the company. European Union law also provides minimum capital requirements for public
65
companies. Moreover, a recent law passed by the legislature
establishing a European corporate form imposes a minimum
66
capital requirement of 120,000 Euros. In recent years, however, the ECJ has cast a skeptical eye on minimum capital requirements imposed by member states. In the Centros case, for
example, the court suggested that minimum capital require67
ments did not achieve the goal of protecting creditors because
concerned creditors could easily protect themselves by asking
68
for some type of security interest or personal guarantee.
Nevertheless, the current state of European Community law
does not indicate that minimum capital requirements will soon
63. Minimum capital requirements are imposed in Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland (only public companies), Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. SETTING UP A COMPANY IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A COUNTRY BY COUNTRY GUIDE (1989) [hereinafter
SETTING UP A COMPANY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY]. Similar laws exist in
the U.S. if corporations have stock with par value. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP.
LAW §§ 504, 506, 513(a) (“Upon issue by a corporation of shares with a par
value, the consideration received therefore shall constitute stated capital to
the extent of the par value of such shares.”). However, corporations often
have the option to issue no-par stock. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 501(a)
(“Each class shall consist of either shares with par value or shares without par
value.”).
64. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 16. But see Luca Enriques
and Johnathan R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case
Against the European Union, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1165 (2001) (arguing that
minimal capital requirements are a “costly and inefficient” mechanism that
provide little protection for creditors).
65. Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC, of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and
others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of
the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of
public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their
capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent, 1977 O.J. (L 26).
66. Id.
67. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. V. Erhvervs-og Selskabeetyrelsen, [1999]
E.C.R. I-1459, para. 35.
68. SE Statute, supra note 21, art. 4(2).
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not indicate that minimum capital requirements will soon be a
thing of the past.
Many EC member states also have laws requiring some form
69
of labor participation in corporate management. France, the
Netherlands, Belgium, and a number of other member states
70
have groups called “works councils” that allow workers infor71
mational and consulting rights within companies. However,
Germany hosts the most debated system of worker participation
72
in Europe. Co-determination is the German practice by which
large companies are required to have labor representation on

69. See generally SETTING UP A COMPANY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
supra note 63. In Belgium, public and private companies that have more than
100 employees must have a “Works Council” that meets once per month to
review employment policies. Id. at 28, 35. In Denmark, in public and private
companies with more than thirty five workers, employees can demand representation on the board of directors, and if the majority of the employees are in
favor, labor can demand equal representation on the board. Id. at 48, 61. In
Ireland, in semi-state-owned public and private companies, employees can
participate in some board activities. Id. at 124, 128. In Luxembourg, public
and private companies with more than fifteen employees must have a workers
delegation and must hold at least six meetings per year. In companies with
more than 150 employees, there must be a joint works council that is comprised of an equal number of employees and employers. Id. at 166-167, 174.
In the Netherlands, public and private companies with more than thirty-five
employees must create a “Works Council” whose approval is necessary for
certain actions. Id. at 186, 194. Finland, Austria, and Sweden also have laws
that require workers in a public limited liability company to be represented by
an administrative organ of the company. See also CARLA TAVARES DA COSTA &
ALEXANDER DE MEESTER BILREIRO, THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE 73 (2003)
[hereinafter COSTA].
70. GROUPS OF COMPANIES IN THE EEC 17, 147, 253 (Eddy Wymeersch ed.
1993) [hereinafter GROUPS OF COMPANIES]. In Belgium: “The Law of 20 September 1948 provides for the installation of a works or ‘enterprise council’ in
the more important enterprises when there [are]…100 or more employees.”
Id. at 17. In the Netherlands: “The right of employees to have a say in corporate policy is concerned-is mainly embodied in the so-called ‘structural provisions’ and the Works Councils Act 1979.” Id. A company with more than 100
employees must have a works council. Id. at 253.
71. Id.
72. GROUPS OF COMPANIES, supra note 70, at 90-92. In Germany, “in contrast to other legal systems, workers are entitled to co-determination in accordance with German Business Constitution Law 47(1).” Id. at 91. See also
Benjamin A. Streeter, III, Co-Determination in West Germany – Through the
Best (and Worst) of Times, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 981, 984, 998 (1982).
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73

the board of directors. Under German law, a company must
have a two-tiered board, composed of the Aufsichtsrat (the upper level or supervisory board) and a Vorstand (lower level or
74
management board). If a company has more than 500 employees, one third of the members of the Aufsichtsrat must be labor
75
representatives. Half of the Aufsichtsrat must be comprised of
labor representatives in companies that are either in the iron,
76
coal or steel industry or have more than 2,000 employees. Codetermination in Germany began in the hard times after the
Second World War as a concession to employees to compensate
77
for the lack of cash available for wages. In the contemporary
setting, co-determination is viewed as a political arrangement
that affects wealth distribution and extends the value of democ78
racy to the private sphere. German company law is designed
not only to maximize shareholder wealth, but also to serve the
79
The “real seat” doctrine is a tool that preserves
workforce.
Germany’s demanding co-determination provisions by preventing companies from incorporating under more lenient legal sys80
tems where workers have no place in corporate governance.
D. The Societas Europaea
Since the commencement of the European Union, lawmakers
have suggested that a European corporate form would be useful

73. Eddy Wymeersch, The Corporate Governance Discussion in Some
European States, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 11
(DD. Prentice & P.R.J. Holland eds., 1993).
74. Id.
75. SETTING UP A COMPANY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 63, at
93, 101. This includes both public and private companies. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 IOWA J. CORP. L. 657, 719 (1996) (arguing that participatory management is highly effective).
78. Interest Groups, Co-determination at http://xroads.virginia.edu/~MA
98/pollklas/thesis/codglossary.html (last visited July 4, 2004) (paraphrasing
Bundesregierung Deutschland).
79. See Jens Dammann, The Future of Codetermination After Centros: Will
German Corporate Law Move Closer to the US Model?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 607, 608 (2003) (arguing that the Centros decision does not destroy codetermination but will bring changes in European corporate law) [hereinafter
Dammann, Codetermination After Centros].
80. COSTA, supra note 69, at 5.
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81

in the common market. The European Commission submitted
drafts of a Societas Europaea (“SE”) corporate form in 1970,
82
83
84
1975, 1989, and 1991. The original SE proposal was vetoed
by member states because the draft was too far beyond the
85
reach of national corporate law. The 1989 and 1991 versions
of the SE statute were grounded in national law, but still were
unsatisfactory to states because of disagreements about co86
determination in Germany under the SE system. Finally, a
compromise was reached. On October 8, 2001, the Council
87
passed regulation 2157/2001 establishing the SE.
The SE statute provides an alternative international corporate form that is recognized throughout Europe. Its primary
purpose is to provide companies with the means to expand over
state lines without the high transaction costs associated with
88
setting up subsidiaries in multiple states and legal systems.
Unlike other national corporate forms (especially those in “real
seat” states), a SE can transfer its headquarters from one mem89
ber state to another without dissolution. Also, the SE could
provide a company in a “real seat” jurisdiction with the means
90
to move to another member state.
81. See, e.g., Johan de Bruycker, EC Company Law—The European Company v. the European Economic Interest Grouping and the Harmonization of
the National Company Laws, 21 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 191, 192, 199-200
(1991). See also Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union—A Plan to Move Forward: Communication
from the Commission to the Council and The European Parliament, COM
(2003) final at 284 1.1. Thus far, no directive dealing with these conflict of
laws issues has been agreed upon, but a European corporate form has been
passed. The 10th and 14th directives would have dealt with harmonization in
merger and acquisition law, but they did not pass. High Level Group Report,
supra note 8, at 111. See also Blaurock, supra note 12, at 384.
82. Id.
83. COSTA, supra note 69, at 5.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 5. Terence L. Blackburn, The Societas Europea: The Evolving
European Corporation Statute, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 685, 708, 750–52 (1993).
87. SE Statute, supra note 21. See also COSTA, supra note 69, at 5.
88. See COSTA, supra note 69, at 11.
89. SE Statute, supra note 21, art. 1(3). See also Lombardo and Pasotti,
supra note 59, at 4.
90. Luca Enrique, Silence is Golden: The European Company Statute as a
Catalyst for Company Law Arbitrage, at 5 (European Corporate Governance
Institute, Working Paper No. 07/2003, March 2003), available at
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However, the availability of the SE is limited. A SE can be
formed in only four ways: by a merger of companies from
91
different member states; by the creation of a holding company
92
with components in different member states; by the creation of
93
a SE subsidiary of companies from at least two member states;
or by the conversion of a public limited company that has, for at
94
least two years, had a subsidiary in another member state.
Additionally, the SE imposes a minimum paid-in capital re95
quirement of 120,000 Euros. Because of these formation requirements, the SE is mainly a viable option for large compa96
nies.
Unlike the corporate forms used in the individual member
states, the SE statute resolves the difficulties related to recognition and the choice of applicable law if the SE moves its head97
quarters. Recognition is mandatory under the SE statute but
98
the SE must register in the state where it has headquarters.
The company laws of the state of registration govern the company. If the SE wishes to move its headquarters to a new
99
member state, it can do so without dissolution. However, the
company must re-register and subject itself to the laws of the
100
If the company fails to register in the
new member state.
state of its headquarters, the statute imposes sanctions such as
http://www.ecgi.org/wp (“Hence, for instance, the formation by a merger of an
SE of the Irish type between an ‘active’ Portuguese company and a newly
formed Irish shell company totally owned by the former would be legal.”)
[hereinafter Enriques, Arbitrage].
91. SE Statute, supra note 21, art. 17.
92. Id. at art. 32.
93. Id. at arts. 35-36.
94. Id. at art. 37.
95. Id. at art. 4(2). 120,000 Euros = 151,416 U.S. Dollars as of October 21,
2004. Oanda, the Currency Site, at http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic (last
visited Oct. 13, 2004).
96. High Level Group Report, supra note 8, at 114, 117. See also Charles
de Navacelle, Legislative Development: Council Regulation No. 2157/2001 of
October 8, 2001 Establishing the European Company Statute, 9 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 199, 201 (2002).
97. SE Statute, supra note 21, art. 1(3) (“The SE shall have legal personality.”).
98. Id. at art. 5.
99. Id. at art. 8.
100. Companies can object to laws of a new member state unless those laws
are considered part of public interest. Id. at art. 8(14).
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101

Therefore, the SE is probably the only type of
liquidation.
company that can move its headquarters from one “real seat”
102
state to another without dissolution.
Conversely, a company
formed under the laws of a “place of incorporation” member
state can move to another “place of incorporation” member state
without dissolution and without changing the laws applicable to
its internal affairs. Thus, companies in a “place of incorporation” member state may find that their national corporate form
103
is more versatile than the SE form.
In addition to providing a minimum capital requirement, the
SE statute also provides guidelines for labor participation.
104
In
These guidelines are located in a supplemental directive.
the directive, priority is given to the agreements between man105
The
agement and employees before the entity became a SE.
directive has a default provision if an agreement cannot be
reached because the SE spans jurisdictions where different
106
The
groups of workers have different rights of participation.
default provision includes mandatory worker participation if
most of the employees of the combined entities of the SE had
107
The law is
participation rights before the SE was formed.
structured so that a company domiciled in a state where worker
participation is mandatory cannot escape this requirement by
108
becoming a SE.
The SE simplifies some multinational corporate activities, but
it is not a viable solution for all companies. First of all, transaction costs associated with the SE will initially be restrictive
since the statute has yet to be interpreted by courts. The statute leaves room for interpretation because it does not draw

101. Id. at art. 64.
102. See Navacelle, supra note 96, at 200.
103. See Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 31–32 (“Before the court rendered its
opinion in the Überseering case, [the SE was a] considerable innovation[].
One will have to determine to what extent Überseering will have a dampening
effect of the innovative function of the Statute’s rule.”).
104. EC Directive 2001/86/EC (Oct. 8, 2001) (Supplementing the Statute for
a European Company with Regard to the Involvement of Employees).
105. Id. at Preamble, section 18.
106. Id. at Annex.
107. Id. at Preamble, section 18.
108. Id. at Preamble, section 3.
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Second, the
bright lines between SE law and national law.
problem of cross-border recognition still exists because the SE
form is not available for all companies and excludes less capital110
Third, companies in “place of incorporation”
ized companies.
states may find that their national laws are more flexible than
111
the SE. Finally, companies in “real seat” states may avoid the
SE in order to pursue creative ways to avoid worker participation. Thus, even with the introduction of a SE statute, most
European companies will still face difficulties if they desire to
move their headquarters to a new state.
E. Case Law Interpreting Corporate Mobility Under The
EC Treaty
1. The Daily Mail Case
In recent years, the ECJ has made several important rulings
interpreting the effect of the freedom of establishment on corporate entities. In the Daily Mail case, Daily Mail and General
Trust (“Daily Mail”), an investment holding company, sought to
change its principal place of business from the U.K. to the
112
The U.K., which is a “place of incorporation”
Netherlands.
state, permits a U.K. company to move its principal place of
business to another state without dissolution. However, a company must obtain permission from the local government to
113
move its head office because in the U.K., a company is liable
114
Daily Mail
for taxes in the jurisdiction of its headquarters.
asked local officials for permission to move, but moved without
115
an answer because it believed that the freedom of establishment permitted it to move its headquarters to a new member

109. Enriques, Arbitrage, supra note 90, at 10, 11 (“The boundaries between
nations and EU law will have to be determined.”). See also Lombardo and
Pasotti, supra note 59, at 18.
110. High Level Group Report, supra note 8, at 117 (admitting a need for a
statute dealing with small and midsize companies, called “SME’s”).
111. Id. at 114 (“Opponents [to the SE] also argue that the European corporate environment should not be cluttered up with yet another legal form”).
112. Daily Mail, [1988] E.C.R. 5483.
113. Id. at para. 5.
114. Id. at paras. 6, 7.
115. Id. at para. 6.
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116

Its purpose
state without authorization from its home state.
for moving, as perceived by the court, was to avoid British capi117
tal gains taxes.
In this case, the ECJ ruled that the freedom of establishment
did not apply to a company that transfers its headquarters to
118
another member state. Therefore, the tax authorities had the
119
right to decline Daily Mail’s request to move out of the U.K.
The court reasoned that corporations are unlike humans in that
corporations only exist because of a privilege extended by national law. Thus, the freedom of establishment provides them
120
Although the Daily Mail court narrowly
only limited rights.
defined the effect of the freedom of establishment on companies,
subsequent decisions suggest that the Daily Mail interpretation
was colored by the possible existence of tax evasion. Daily Mail
has not been completely overturned, but has been viewed narrowly by the ECJ in subsequent decisions.
2. The Centros Case
121

In the Centros case, Danish nationals Mr. and Mrs. Bryde
registered a company in the U.K. in order to do business
through a branch in Denmark. They structured the corporate
entity in this way to avoid the minimum capital requirement
122
imposed in Denmark. When the Brydes attempted to register
their branch, Danish authorities refused their application based
on the conclusion that the U.K. wing of the business existed
123
only as a fraudulent holding company for the Danish branch.
The court disagreed and ruled that registering a company in
another member state to avoid minimum capital laws is not
fraud, even if the company does not intend to do business in the

116. Id. at para. 8.
117. Id. at para. 8.
118. Id. at para. 25.
119. Id. at para. 24.
120. Id. at para. 19 (“Unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of the
law and in the present state of Community law, creatures of national law.
They exist only by virtue of the varying national legislation which determines
their incorporation and functioning.”).
121. Centros, [1999] E.C.R. I-1459.
122. Id. at paras. 3, 4, 14.
123. Id. at paras. 7, 23.
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124

Under the freedom of establishment,
state of incorporation.
when a company is properly formed in accordance with the laws
of a member state, other member states must recognize a
125
After the Centros decision, propobranch of that company.
nents of the “real seat” doctrine wondered if allowing foreign
companies to operate branches in “real seat” states would un126
dermine their doctrine. They feared any company could incorporate aboard and operate in a “real seat” state under the guise
127
of a branch to avoid local law.
In Centros, the court also ruled that member states have the
right to make laws that impose additional requirements on foreign corporations, so long as those laws are “applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, justified by imperative requirements in
the general interest [of society], do not go beyond what is necessary,” and “are suitable for securing the attainment of the objec128
The court held that because creditive which they pursue.”
tors were already on notice that the Brydes’ company was a foreign corporation, and thus could have asked for a guarantee or
security interest if they were concerned, Danish minimum capi129
tal requirements did not meet this four-part “necessity” test.
124. Id. at paras. 17, 18, 29. The court has reaffirmed this test in a recent
case. See Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., [2003] ECJ CELEX LEXIS 444, at para. 133.
125. Centros, [1999] E.C.R. I-1459, at para. 39.
126. See generally Dammann, Codetermination After Centros, supra note 79
(arguing that codetermination will probably survive the scrutiny of the European Court of Justice). See also Ebke, Centros Mysteries, supra note 33 (discussing the effects of Centros on national law). But see Holst, supra note 44
(arguing that Centros may not change the conflict of laws in the EU, but
member states probably should change them voluntarily to increase efficiency).
127. RAMMELOO, supra note 1, at 72. In regard to Centros he explains that:
A number of German commentators seem to be convinced that this
ruling means that member states are obliged to relinquish the Sitztheorie…From now on, natural and legal foreign persons alike should
be welcomed in Germany or any other member state of the European
Union; the latter category would no longer have to worry about adjusting their structure to the company laws of the state of establishment. Germany had better get used to…companies established
abroad, having their real seat on German territory.
Id.
128. Centros, [1999] E.C.R. I-1459, para. 33.
129. Id. at para. 37.
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This part of the decision left member states wondering whether
worker participation requirements would pass the four-part test
130
in Centros. Their question was answered in part by the Überseering decision.
II. THE ÜBERSEERING DECISION AND THE CONTINUED
EXPANSION OF THE FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT
A. The Factual Background
Überseering BV (Beslolen Vennootschap), a company that
131
was registered under Dutch corporate law in August, 1990,
132
was acquired by two German citizens in December, 1995.
Three years earlier, Überseering had hired Nordic Construction
Company Baumanagement GmbH (“NCC”), the defendants in
this case, to paint a structure on a piece of property that it ac133
Claiming that the work was defective,
quired in Germany.
Überseering sued NCC for breach of contract in a German re134
The court dismissed the case, ruling that Übergional court.
135
seering lacked standing to bring the suit. Under German conflict of laws, which follows the “real seat” doctrine, a court must
apply German law to a company with its headquarters or center
136
The court concluded that
of administration in Germany.
when German nationals purchased the shares of Überseering,
the company’s center of administration inadvertently shifted to
137
Since the company did not register in Germany,
Germany.
the court refused to recognize the entity. Although this conclu138
sion is not codified, it is strictly adhered to in German courts.
It is also worth noting that German law will recognize an unregistered foreign corporation as a defendant. Before bringing

130. See generally Dammann, Codetermination After Centros, supra note 79.
131. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 2.
132. Id. at para. 7.
133. Id. at para. 6.
134. Id. at paras. 6, 8. Überseering sued in the lower German court, which
is called the Landgericht. Id.
135. Id. at paras. 8, 9.
136. Id. at para. 4.
137. Id. at para. 9.
138. Id.
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this case, Überseering defended a case in a German court
139
against one of its architects.
The German appeals court, the Oberlandesgericht, affirmed
140
141
The Bundesgerichtshof, the
the decision of the lower court.
142
highest court, requested a preliminary ruling from the ECJ.
The question was framed as follows:
whether, where a company formed in accordance with the legislation of a Member State (A) in which it has its registered office is deemed, under the law of another Member State (B), to
have moved its actual centre of administration to Member
State B, Articles 43 EC and 48 EC preclude Member State B
from denying the company legal capacity, and therefore the
capacity to bring legal proceedings before its national courts in
order to enforce rights under a contract with a company established in Member State B.143

The court concluded that Articles 43 and 48 preclude member
state B (or Germany, in this case) from refusing to recognize
144
Thus, a company can
company A (Überseering in this case).
move its headquarters from an “incorporation” state to a “real
seat” state and gain recognition if the company was properly
formed in accordance with the laws of any member state. The
court found Überseering analogous to Centros because both examine the relationship between a host state and a corpora145
The court held that despite the broad language in the
tion.
Daily Mail decision, it is distinguishable from this case be146
cause it applies to restrictions on a company’s ability to move

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at para. 12.
Id. at para. 10.
Id. at para. 11.
Id. at para. 21.
Id. at para. 22.
Id. at para. 94. The decision states:

Such objectives cannot, however, justify denying the legal capacity
and, consequently, the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings of a
company properly incorporated in another Member State in which it
has its registered office. Such a measure is tantamount to an outright
negation of the freedom of establishment.
Id.
145. Id. at 40.
146. Centros, [1999] E.C.R. I-1459, paras. 39, 62, 65.
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out of its home state, not a company’s right to recognition in a
147
host state.
B. Überseering’s Holding and Reasoning
The defendant, NCC, was joined in its argument by Germany,
Spain and Italy. These parties gave three major arguments in
favor of the German interpretation of the freedom of establishment. First, they claimed that corporate recognition is not
mandatory under current EC law without individual state con148
sent.
Second, they maintained that the facts of Daily Mail,
149
and not Centros, are analogous to the present proceeding.
And third, they argued that protecting German substantive labor and capital laws justified sanctions against foreign compa150
nies that operated in Germany.
The defendants further argued that a state is under no obligation to recognize a foreign company unless it consents by con151
According to the Treaty Establishing the
vention or treaty.
European Community, “Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals...the mutual recognition
152
of companies or firms.” The negotiations that followed the
Treaty produced the Convention on the Mutual Recognition of
153
but it was never entered into
Companies and Legal Persons,
154
The defendants maintained that the text of the Treaty
force.
Establishing the European Community proves that the framers
of the EC acknowledged differences in recognition standards
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at paras. 69-71.
Id. at paras. 23, 24.
Id. at paras. 29, 31.
Id. at paras. 88, 89.
Id. at para. 23.
EC TREATY, supra note 2, art. 293 (ex 220). The Treaty states that:

Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations
with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals: the mutual recognition of companies or firms within the
meaning of the second paragraph of Art. 48 (ex 58), the retention of
legal personality in the event of transfer of their seat from one country to another, and the possibility of mergers between companies or
firms governed by the laws of different countries.
Id.
153. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, paras. 25, 26.
154. Id. at paras. 26-28.
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within the Community and elected to keep those differences
155
Therefore, the defendants asserted that Germany has
intact.
156
no obligation to recognize a foreign company’s existence.
157
The court rejected this argument and agreed with the
European Commission which joined the Netherlands, the U.K.
and the European Free Trade Surveillance Authority (“EFTA”)
in making arguments on behalf of Überseering. These parties
asserted that ECJ case law should facilitate harmonization in
areas when it is necessary to uphold the freedom of establish158
Article 293 affords states the opportunity to negotiate
ment.
for the mutual recognition of companies, but not the right to
159
The court found that the right to recognideny recognition.
160
tion falls within the freedom of establishment and that companies that are formed in accordance with the law of a member
state and have their central administration and principal place
of business in a member state are entitled to the same benefits
161
as natural persons. Likewise, in the EC, commercial establishments can set up and manage a business under the same
conditions as domestic businesses without losing their legal
personality. This mandatory recognition approach to the freedom of establishment is consistent with Centros.
The defendants also encouraged the court to follow its precedent in the Daily Mail case, which restricts the application of
the freedom of establishment to companies. In Daily Mail, the
court plainly stated that the freedom of establishment does not
162
In Überseering,
extend to the transfer of a company’s seat.
155. Id. at para. 26.
156. Id. Spain also argues that the “General Programme for the abolition of
restrictions on the freedom of establishment, adopted in Brussels on Dec. 18,
1961,” mentions that companies should have a continuous link with the economy of a member state in order to take advantage of the abolitions of restrictions on freedom of establishment. Id. at paras. 33, 34. The court holds that
this requirement only applies to companies that do not have a link to the EU.
Id. at para. 74.
157. Id. at para. 60 (“It is not necessary for the Member States to adopt a
convention on the mutual recognition of companies in order for companies
meeting the conditions set out in Article 48 EC to exercise the freedom of establishment conferred on them by Articles 43 EC and 48 EC.”).
158. Id. at para. 37.
159. Id. at paras. 54, 55, 56, 98.
160. Id. at para. 54.
161. Id. at para. 56.
162. Id at para. 24.
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the court distinguished Daily Mail because that case “concerned
relations between a company and the Member State under
whose laws it had been incorporated” and “the present case concerns the recognition by one Member State of a company incor163
Also, it
porated under the law of another Member State.”
noted that Daily Mail was not a case about the denial of a company’s legal personality. Therefore, Daily Mail is still good law
when applied to a company and its home state, but not when
164
applied to a company and a foreign state.
Finally, the defendants argued that the restrictions on Überseering were justified by the need to protect third parties
through German labor law, tax law, minimum capital law, and
165
While the court gave a nod to these
private company law.
interests, it concluded that none of them outweighed the fundamental right of recognition provided for by the freedom of
166
The court also noted that “it is not certain
establishment.
that requirements associated with a minimum amount of share
capital are an effective way of protecting creditors,” and German capital laws are, “in some respects less strict” than those
167
However, the decision concedes that in some
in other states.
instances laws that protect the “general good” could justify a
168
restriction on a corporation’s the freedom of establishment.
III. EFFECTS AND ANALYSIS OF ÜBERSEERING
A. The Practical Effects of Überseering on SE’s and Domestic
Companies
In Überseering, the court expanded Centros by once again
finding that the freedom of establishment preempts state con-

163. Id. at para. 62.
164. Id. at para. 62.
165. Id. at paras. 87-90.
166. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, paras. 36, 92, 93. See also Centros,
[1999] E.C.R. I-1459, para. 37 (the laws must “be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, they must be justified by imperative requirements in
the general interest” [of society], “they must not go beyond what is necessary”
and they must “be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which
they pursue”).
167. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, paras. 87, 91.
168. Id. at para. 92.
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169

Before Überseering, many scholars beflict of laws theories.
lieved that the freedom of establishment only preempted laws
170
that applied to a company’s secondary establishment.
The
Überseering court did not view the freedom of establishment in
such narrow terms. It held that “Article 48 provides for the
progressive abolition of restrictions on the freedom of estab171
lishment of individuals,” and companies, not just their sub172
However,
sidiaries, are to be treated the same as individuals.
the holding is ambiguous when applied to companies that are
registered in “real seat” states. Also, the combination of the
Überseering holding and the SE statute presents new ques173
tions.
1. Moving From a “Place of Incorporation” State to Another
“Place of Incorporation” State
Prior to Überseering, a company from a “place of incorporation” state could move its center of administration to another
“place of incorporation” state and the new state would recognize
174
the company as a legal entity. The Überseering decision does
not change this result, but it does confirm the assertion in Centros that “it is not inconceivable that overriding requirements
relating to the general interest, such as the protection of the
interests of creditors, minority shareholders, employees and
even taxation authorities may, in certain circumstances and

169. See generally Dominic E. Robertson, Überseering, Nailing the Coffin on
Sitztheorie?, 24 THE COMPANY LAWYER 184 (2003) (arguing that the Überseering decision supports an expansive view of the freedom of establishment and
narrows the validity of the “real seat” doctrine).
170. Ebke, Centros Mysteries, supra note 33, at 654.
171. VILLIERS, supra note 16, at 18.
172. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 56.
173. See Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 31. See also Jamie Dorman Storey,
The European Company Statute: The Vision v. The Reality and the Challenges
Lying Ahead, at 7 (Leiden University, The Netherlands, Working Paper,
2002), available at http://www.juridix.net/eu_soc/essay3_se.htm (last visited
Sept. 27, 2004).
174. Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine, supra note 27, at 36. But see Dammann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 19. Some states, even
those that adhere strictly to the place of incorporation doctrine do not allow
corporations to change their “statutory domicile and retain their legal personality.” Id. This is probably because the states do not want to forgo tax collection.

File: Gildea Macro Note 1123.doc

2004]

Created on: 11/23/2004 4:29 PM

Last Printed: 11/23/2004 4:30 PM

EUROPEAN COMPANY PASSPORT

283

subject to certain conditions, justify restrictions on the freedom
175
of establishment” so long as the restrictions do not negate the
176
freedom of establishment. Presumably, a host state could im177
pose special guarantees for creditors or special capital regula178
tions on foreign companies, but it cannot require companies to
179
Companies
reincorporate as a prerequisite to recognition.
would be wise to consider the possible range of requirements
that may fall under the “general good” exception before moving
180
to a new state. For example, after the decision in Centros, the
Danish government imposed a tax requirement on foreign com181
Likewise,
panies in lieu of a minimum capital requirement.
Germany still may find a way to require labor participation in
foreign companies that are doing business in Germany without
182
offending the freedom of establishment.
183
However, in the recent Inspire Art case, the ECJ gave a
strict interpretation to the “general good” exception. This strict
interpretation, along with the court’s refusal to apply the “general good” exception in Überseering, may indicate a high bar for
the application of the exception. In Inspire Art, a psuedoforeign company that was registered in the U.K. and operating
184
in the Netherlands argued that aggressive Dutch laws de185
manding additional requirements for foreign corporations en175. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 92.
176. Id. at para. 81.
177. Centros, [1999] E.C.R. I-1459, para. 21.
178. See Roth, supra note 34, at 201.
179. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 81.
180. Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 26.
181. Kersting, supra note 24, at 63 (“In a reaction to Centros, Denmark has
enacted a tax law that requires foreign corporations to put up a guarantee,”
which is “the equivalent of the minimum capital requirement.”).
182. Id.
183. See Inspire Art, [2003] ECJ CELEX LEXIS 444.
184. Id. at paras. 34, 35.
185. Id. at paras. 23-28. Dutch law imposes special requirements on formally foreign companies: companies who are registered outside of the Netherlands, but conduct no business in their state of registration. The requirements include “various obligations concerning the company’s registration in
the commercial register, an indication of that status in all the documents produced by it, the minimum share capital and the drawing-up, production and
publication of the annual documents.” Id. The law also imposes “penalties in
case of non-compliance with those provisions.” Id. at para. 23. The law also
states that “directors [are] to be jointly and severally liable with the company
for legal acts carried out in the name of the company during their directorship
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croached upon the freedom of establishment because they imposed obligations on foreign companies that “render the right of
186
establishment markedly less attractive for those companies.”
In its response, the Netherlands claimed that extra requirements for foreign corporations were justified because of “overriding reasons related to the public interest” such as
“counter[ing] fraud, protect[ing] creditors and ensur[ing] that
tax inspections are effective and that business dealings are
187
In this case, the court found that the extra requirefair.”
188
It
ments imposed by the Netherlands were discriminatory.
held that if national laws treat foreign companies differently
from national companies, then those laws are contrary to EC
189
law. Thus, Inspire Art and Überseering maintain that a “general good” exception exists, but exceptions that are discriminatory or unduly burdensome violate the freedom of establishment.
2. Moving From a “Place of Incorporation” State
to a “Real Seat” State
Prior to Überseering, if a company moved its center of administration from a “place of incorporation” state to a “real
seat” state, the “real seat” state would refuse to recognize the
company. The court attacked this result and held that denying
recognition in such a case would offend the freedom of estabuntil the requirement of registration in the commercial register has been fulfilled.” Id. at para. 25. In addition, the law requires that “it [is] to be indicated
that the company is formally foreign and prohibits the making of statements
in documents or publications which give the false impression that the undertaking belongs to a Netherlands legal person.” Id. at para. 26. Moreover, the
law says, “the subscribed capital of a formally foreign company must be at
least equal to the minimum amount required of Netherlands limited companies.” Id. at para. 27. And it requires that “until the conditions relating to
capital and paid-up share capital have been satisfied, the directors are jointly
and severally liable with the company for all legal acts carried out during
their directorship which are binding on the company.” Id. “The directors of a
formally foreign company are likewise jointly and severally responsible for the
company’s acts if the capital subscribed and paid-up falls below the minimum
required, having originally satisfied the minimum capital requirement…” Id.
at para. 28.
186. Id. at para. 90.
187. Id. at para. 109.
188. Id. at paras. 127, 128.
189. Id. at para. 64.
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190

lishment. However, crucial questions about such a move still
remain. For example, the court requires that a “real seat” host
state recognize a European foreign company in its territory.
But, the court does not specify whether the host state must apply internal affairs law from the state of registration. Thus, it
is still unclear how far the host state must go in recognizing the
191
legal personality of the company or whether current case law,
taken as a whole, sufficiently requires member states to apply
192
In Überseerthe law of a corporation’s place of registration.
ing, the court stated that “[t]he location of the[] registered office, central administration or principal place of business constitutes the connecting factor with the legal system of a particular
Member State in the same way as does nationality in the case of
193
Of course states will likely want to assert
a natural person.”
194
their own laws wherever possible.
However, it is unclear if a
member state can refuse to apply the laws of the place of incor195
poration without offending the freedom of establishment.
Apart from offending the EC Treaty, the possibility that a
host state will apply its own law to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation gives rise to practical considerations. If the
laws of the original state of registration do not apply to a company residing in a host state, complicated res judicata situations could occur if internal affairs issues are adjudicated in
196
both the home and host state. Presumably, these inconsistencies will give rise to burdensome legal expenses and come as a
surprise to creditors. This is especially true in a case like Überseering, where there is no indication that the plaintiff intentionally moved its center of administration to Germany, or that
other member states would consider Überseering’s actions a

190. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 82.
191. Luca Cerioni, The Überseering Ruling: The Eve of a “Revolution” for the
Possibilities of Companies’ Migration Throughout the European Community?,
10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 117, 125–27 (2003).
192. Dammann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 15.
193. Id. at para. 57. But see High Level Group Report, supra note 8, at 106.
Third states are likely not to be involved in the transfer of the seat, but if they
are, they should apply the law of the state of incorporation. Id.
194. Dammann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 15.
195. Cerioni, supra note 191, at 125–27.
196. Ebke, Centros Mysteries, supra note 33, at 654.
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In Überseering, the EFTA persuasively

the refusal to recognise Überseering’s right to be a party to legal proceedings in Germany by reason of the apparently unsolicited transfer of its actual centre of administration to Germany is indicative of the lack of certainty which may be caused
in cross-border transactions when the different private international law rules of the Member States are applied. Since
characterization as a company's actual centre of administration turns, to a large extent, on the facts, it is always possible
that different national legal systems and, within them, different courts may have divergent views on what is an actual centre of administration. Moreover, it is increasingly difficult to
identify a company's actual centre of administration in an international, computerized economy, in which the physical
presence of decision-makers becomes increasingly unnecessary.198

The EFTA poses a valid issue unsolved by Überseering. Under current case law, the issue of “legal personality” and applicable law appear to be at the discretion of the member states so
long as states do not negate the freedom of establishment in
their interpretation.
3. Moving Out of a “Real Seat” State and Into Either a “Place of
Incorporation” State or a “Real Seat” State
When a company wants to move its center of administration
out of a “real seat” state and into another state, Überseering
requires the new state to recognize the company. However, the
holding does not guarantee a company’s ability to move from its
199
Even in the recent Inspire
original state without permission.
Art case, the court continued to distinguish the company-host
state relationship interpreted in Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art, and the company-home state relationship interpreted
200
Writers in this area question the fairness of
in Daily Mail.
197. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 63 (“Überseering never gave
any indication that it intended to transfer its seat to Germany.”).
198. Id. at para. 51 (emphasis added).
199. Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 10, 11 (“In Germany, and according to
some legal writers in France as well, the emigration results in the company
being completely dissolved.”).
200. See Inspire Art, [2003] ECJ CELEX LEXIS 444, para. 103.
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granting EC companies the freedom to immigrate to a new
member state, without granting them the broad right to emi201
grate from their home state.
One scholar suggested that the four-part ‘necessity test’ in
Centros be used to evaluate state restrictions on the emigration
202
of domestic companies. This proposal is reasonable because it
takes into account the valid concerns states may have about
companies moving and failing to settle with creditors or tax au203
thorities. However, under current EC law, member states can
trap domestic companies that want to move out of their territory without justification. Whether the denial of the right to
emigrate is a negation of the freedom of establishment will have
to be considered in future decisions.
4. Moving with the SE Form
Überseering is, in some ways, inconsistent with the SE statute. On one hand, Überseering requires a host state to recognize a European company operating within its borders even if
204
That requirethe company is incorporated in another state.
ment follows a “place of incorporation” approach, although it
does not endorse all elements of the “place of incorporation” doc205
On the other hand, the SE statute requires the SE to
trine.
register in the state of its headquarters, which is synonymous
206
Therefore, if a SE moves its
with the “real seat” doctrine.
headquarters from one state to another without reregistering in
the new state, the Überseering court would require recognition
207
under the freedom of establishment, but the SE statute would
208
impose sanctions such as dissolution.
The introduction of the
SE and the decision in the Überseering case were nearly con201. See Roth, supra note 34, at 206. See also Wymeersch, supra note 23, at
10.
202. Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 28–29.
203. Id.
204. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para 82.
205. Enriques, Arbitrage, supra note 90, at 6. See infra Part III B (1) of this
Note.
206. Lombardo and Pasotti, supra note 59, at 10 (“Article 7 SE-Reg. makes a
clear choice in favor of the real seat theory as the conflict of law rule to be
applied to European Companies registered in the Member States.”).
207. Id. at para. 81.
208. SE Statute, supra note 21, art. 8. If the company fails to register in the
state where it has its real seat, it could be dissolved. Id. at art. 64.
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209

temporaneous, therefore a practical application of both regimes is probably necessary to see if this conflict is of any consequence.
Despite inconsistencies with each other, both the SE statute
and the Überseering holding are beneficial. Some companies
may decide that although Überseering facilitates mobility for
domestic companies, the SE statute is beneficial because its
renvoi technique to national law provides clarity as to what law
210
Also, because the SE
applies to the entity’s internal affairs.
statute is the result of a political compromise, states are less
211
Inspire Art provides an illustration of
likely to disfavor SE’s.
the types of laws that member states pass to restrain disfavored
types of foreign corporations. However, since Überseering was
couched in constitutional terms, the SE statute’s registration
212
requirement may turn out to be an anomaly.
B. Analysis
1. The “Real Seat” Doctrine in the Wake of Überseering
Some academics view the Überseering decision as a clear
message that the “real seat” doctrine is preempted by the free213
Authors went so far as to say that the
dom of establishment.
whole idea of a “real seat” or “center of administration” is outdated in today’s world of modern technology and superior com214
These conclusions stem logically from Überseermunication.
ing because the court ignored German conflict of laws rules
stemming from the “real seat” doctrine and because Überseer215
ing’s center of administration was ubiquitous.
However, it is unlikely that the Überseering decision is broad
enough to eradicate the “real seat” doctrine completely. First,
the Überseering decision does not allow companies the freedom
to move out of their home state. Thus, the free movement asso209. The SE statute was adopted at the end of 2001 and the Überseering
decision was published in June 2002.
210. Enriques, Arbitrage, supra note 90, at 10.
211. Lombardo and Pasotti, supra note 59, at 8.
212. Id. at 12.
213. See, e.g., Dammann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 6.
214. Enriques, supra note 90, at 6. See also Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I9919, para. 51.
215. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para. 63.
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ciated with the “place of incorporation” doctrine is still unreal216
Second, the decision does not
ized for many EC companies.
go so far as to suggest that the use of a “territorial” or “real
seat” approach is inappropriate in all circumstances. On the
contrary, it signals that either the “location of the[] registered
office, central administration or principal place of business”
217
Moreover, the
could connect a company to a legal system.
th
recent SE Statute, and even the defeated Draft 14 directive,
218
endorse some aspects of the “real seat” doctrine. Thus, it cannot be concluded that the Überseering decision marks the end of
the “real seat” doctrine altogether.
2. Forum-Shopping and Arbitrage After Überseering
The right to move corporate headquarters or set up a branch
in any EC state could cause companies to forum-shop for corpo219
rate charters, favorable tax regimes or mobility. Scholars
216. See Roth, supra note 34, at 207 (“It is to be deplored that the Court
goes only half the way: The judgment is a disappointment as to the issue of
moving out.”). See also Wymeersch, supra note 23, at 18 (“The court’s reasoning leaves substantial uneasiness: the argument that freedom of establishment related only to immigration, but leaves the states free to deal with emigration… is rather theoretical and leaves reality aside.”). See also Cerioni,
supra note 191, at 129. That author states that:
The Court has adopted an halfway approach towards the acceptance
of the incorporation system, because this system can be regarded as
recognized to be the general rule just from the point of view of the host
Member State but not from the point of view of the State in which a
company is formed and from which this company may wish to migrate. (emphasis in original).
Id.
217. Überseering, [2002] E.C.R. I-9919, para 57.
218. Lombardo and Pasotti, Network Economics Approach, supra note 59, at
10. Also, because the Überseering decision goes beyond the rights of mobility
granted by the legislative body, it may prompt new legislation that protects
the “real seat” doctrine.
219. See Dammann, Corporations Free Choice, supra note 37, at 6–7. See
also Cerioni, supra note 191, at 129. According to Cerioni:
Second, and as a result, the present state of national company laws
after the Überseering ruling EC law may essentially offer new opportunities for intra-EC ‘migration’ to those companies formed in countries adopting the incorporation system. In principle, these companies are not prevented from moving their ‘primary establishment’
abroad and, for this reason, could add a new dimension to their ‘fo-
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speculate that the Überseering decision pushes Europe further
towards a regime of free choice in the adoption of corporate
charters, although scholars disagree as to whether this phenomenon will cause a negative race-to-the-bottom or a positive
220
race-to-the-top for corporate charters. Scholars also speculate
that the Überseering decision will prompt existing companies to
move their headquarters to host states with the most favorable
221
This Note proposes, in addition, that companies
tax regime.
will consider forum-shopping for mobility. If a company registers in a state that allows domestic companies to move out, then
the company can later relocate for better proximity to labor or
natural resources, or to alter its tax regime. Being able to make
this type of move is particularly important in the EC context,
because the internal market is expanding, and in the future, tax
incentives and inexpensive labor or resources may be located in
a state that is not even a member of the EC today.
Moreover, as one scholar pointed out “The Member States
adopting the incorporation system tend to be—within the EC—
the States characterized by a tradition of liberal company law
and, at the same time, by the most favorable tax regimes in
222
Thus, it is possible that the increased movarious respects.”
bility will cause companies to migrate toward liberal states, and
cause states that prohibit emigration, impose high taxes, and
inflict tough, conservative corporate laws to become more competitive.
3. The Result
Although the Überseering decision does not dispose of the
“real seat” doctrine or give clear rules for corporate mobility, the
result is proper considering the goal of a common market, the
spirit of compromise within the Union, and the narrow question
presented to the court. Corporations are a major force in the
rum-shopping’ practices involving both the company law and the corporate taxation aspects.
Id.
220. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
221. Cerioni, supra note 191, at 130, 139 (arguing that companies will try to
register so that their places of incorporation are in a states with favorable
company laws and their headquarters are in states where taxes are favorable).
222. Id.
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European economy, and true integration cannot be achieved
when companies are denied recognition. However, the court in
Überseering was not well positioned to solve deep-rooted differences in corporate and conflict of laws doctrines within the
European Community. Thus, many questions are left open after the decision.
This Note asserts that Überseering, whether intentionally or
not, applies the freedom of establishment in a way most beneficial to new companies. This is a positive result because new
companies are the very entities that are excluded from the SE
223
Before Überseering, a new company that wanted to
statute.
move its headquarters out of a “real seat” state would have to
wait until it had the capital and interstate connections to be224
come a SE. New companies now have another option that old
companies, already established in states that restrict emigration, do not have. Based on Centros, new entities in “real seat”
states can register shell corporations in “place of incorporation”
225
states merely to reap the benefits of the foreign legal regime.
After Überseering, it is apparent that a company can register a
shell corporation in a “place of incorporation” state, set up its
headquarters in any state, and move its headquarters to any
226
Hence, new companies in “real seat” states will be instate.
clined to register in a member state that permits mobility and
emigration of domestic corporations. Without this option, many
new companies would be left to register in “real seat” states
that will not allow them to move out, even if such a move became economically beneficial. Überseering allows new companies to forum-shop for mobility and later move their headquarters to a state with the labor resources, natural resources, consumer markets, tax regime, and/or corporate regulations necessary to ensure continued success in the ever-expanding and
ever-changing European marketplace.

223. High Level Group Report, supra note 8, at 114.
224. SE Statute, supra note 21, at arts. 4(2), 17, 32, 35, 36, 37.
225. Centros, [1999] E.C.R. I-1459, para. 39. See also Überseering, [2002]
E.C.R. I-9919, ruling 1.
226. But see Roth, supra note 34, at 208 (It is unclear if the “law stands on
equal footing with regard to the formation of companies.”). Id. at 208.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Unless a European directive is adopted, different national
systems of corporate recognition will persist in Europe. Both
theories of corporate recognition discussed in this Note have
benefits. However, the “place of incorporation” doctrine coexists
best with the goal of a single European market because it recognizes foreign companies and the laws that govern their internal affairs and it allows companies to move to a new state.
Nonetheless, various European member states prefer the “real
seat” doctrine because it gives them control over the legal entities in their territory.
Moreover, both of these national systems of corporate recognition are being chipped away by the decisions of the European
Court of Justice and by new statutes and directives. Presently,
a hybrid system of recognition exists in Europe. It consists of
national rules, EC rules, and a somewhat substantial zone of
ambiguity between the two regimes. The Überseering decision
is important because it sends a clear message that ambiguities
will be resolved in favor of the Community and the single market.
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